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A review of the history of the United States to the year
shows no insurmountable difficulties in the application of the
provisions of the Constitution to newly acquired territory. The powers
necessary to the government of dependencies, were assumed by Congress.
#1
Said Chief Justice Marshall, "The power of governing and legislating
for a territrry is the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire
and hold territory. Could this position toe contested the Constitution
of the United States declares that, "The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States." The
provisions in the treaties of cession guaranteed the civil status
of new territory. Civil rights were extended to the peoples coming
into the American Union through the action of Congress in carrying
out the treaty provisions
The treaty by which we acquired Louisiana contained the clause,
» The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the
union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, accord-
ing to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment
of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the Unite
j
States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in
the free enjoyment of_their liberty, property, and the religion
which they profess "'
Like provisions are found in the treaties governing the Florida,
Mexican and Alaskan acquisitions. In the treaty ceding Mexico it was
provided that, "The Mexicans who shall not preserve the character of^
citizens of the Mexican Republic shall be incorporated into the Union
#1- Lere and Laraldc v Pitot and others, 6 Cranch 332.
#2- Constitution of the United States, Art. »)-, sec. 3.
fe- Louisiana Treaty of 1803* Art. Ill; Haswel \
nre .ties, p. $62
.
utuc
2the United States, and be admitted at the proper time ( to be Judged
by the Congress of the United States ) to th 8 enjoyment of all the
rights of citizens of the United States according to the principles
of the Constitution, and in the meantime shall be maintained and
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and
#1
secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction."
There seems to have been little question of the plenary power of
Congress to govern the territories. President Jefferson decided that
the limitations of the Constitutions upon the Federal legislative
power applied only to the exercise of those powers with reference to
the states when Louisiana was acquired. As far as territories of the
United States were concerned the powers of Congress were unrestricted.
This view generally prevailed in the legislation enacted. At the time
of the Mexican cession it was claimed by Calhoun that ceded territory
became an integral part of the United States by virtue of the act of
cession and that to such territory, the Constitution, with its safe-
guards to civil liberty extended "ex proprio vigore." This view was
later upheld and given authority in the famous Dred Scott decision,
declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. According to this
view, states and territories were accorded a like status respecting
constitutional limitations.
Notwithstanding the different opinions respecting the relation of
our Constitution to the dependencies, the inhabitants of newly acquire
Territory were not long deprived of any constitutional benefits.
They shared great civil privileges naturally. Except for Alaska, the
new country was contiguous; the people were of the same race,
customs, and religion as ourselves; No question as to their
capability to assume the responsibilities of self-government, to
^1- Art. IX. Treaty with Mexico. ISkS.

3enjoy in full the rights of citizenship, existed. The few tribal
elements in Alaska offered no obstacle to the extension of civil
rights. The treaty by which this territory became part of the United
states contained the clause, "That the inhabitants of the ceded
territory with the exception of the uncivilized native tribes,
shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and
immunities df citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained
and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and
#1
religion ."
In 189#, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Guam fell into our
possession as a result of the war With Spain. The same year, Hawaii
was annexed by joint resolution of congress. Tutuila, with its
valuable harbor of Pago-Pago was acquired thru convention with Great
Eritain and Germany.
It was at once perceived that these new territories vrere in many
respects unlike the old. A situation had been created which would be
attended by not a few difficulties. The newly acquired territory had
a people whose social and political condition was not of the same
nature as our own. "The new peoples wore different fro» us in re.ligioty
customs, laws, methods of taxation, modes of thought, administration
#2
of government, and conception of justice." The extension to them of
rights and privileges of citizens of the United States could not be
granted as in the case, without exception, of previously acquired
dominion
.
Old theories respecting the power of Congress over the territories
naturally revived. "3x proprio vigore" doctrines were re-expounded.
One class of thinkers declared that the limitations imposed by the
#1 Art. Ill, Treaty with Russia, 186j, Haswell,pp7i|£
#2Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States, pp 171

1*.
Constitution apply only to the states and that the United states
territorially, included only states; another school holding exactly
opposite views, proclaimed that the limitations of* the constitution
apply wherever the jurisdiction of the United States extends and all
territory in the possession of the United States.
The treaty of cession With Spain made no provision for the incor-
poration of the new inhabitants as citizens of the United states. No
express clause respecting status guaranteed the extension of cifcil
rights, as we have seen are found in previous instruments dealing
with newly acquired territory. The treaty states simply, "The oivil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territor-
ies hereby ceded to the United States, shall be determined by the
#1
Congress.
Rights in dependencies a^ affected by the legal relation of the
subject people to the ruling power is by no rleans a new question. It
was old when our first acquisition caused a debate in Congress, "/hat
is temed by Sioussat the "leading case" defining this relation, was
decided by some English judges early in the 17th. century, viz.,
Calvin's n^.e. It referred to the situation of the post-nati in Scot-
land on the occasion of the union of that country with England. The
judges stated in their decision that a dependency was " a parcel of
the flealm in tenure" and that Parliament might make any statute to
bind such dependency where the latter was definitely named; bux. with-
al*
out such special meaning, a statute did not bind. It would seem then
that Parliament was free to make such laws a3 were deemed fit for any
particular dependency.
#1-Art. IX, Treaty of Peace with Spain, 1898
#2-Louisiana Purchase
sioussat, "The English Statutes in Maryland," II, 19
jfc- Snow, "Administration of Dependencies." pp32

5-
This attitude was also maintained in the ease of Blankard v. Galdy
which decided the status of the inhabitants of the colony of Jamaica.
In the Earl of Derby's case decided shortly afterward, the court held
that English statutes did not bind the inhabitants of the Isle of Man
#1
unless they were specially mentioned. re have the opinion of Attorne;
General .'/est given in 1720, viz., " The common law of England is the
common lav/ of the plantations and all statutes in affirmance of the
oo&non law, passed in England antecedent Bo the settlement of a
colony, are in force in that colony unless there is some private Act
to the contrary; though no statutes, made since those settlements are
thus in force unless the colonists are particularly mentioned. Let an
Englishman go where he will, he carries as much of lav/ and liberty
#2
with him as the nature of things Will bear."
BlacKstone maintained that in conquered o~ ceded countries(one of
the numerous classes of dependencies of Great Britain ) that have laws
of their own, the King may, indeed, alter and change those laws, but
till he doo3 actually change them, the ancient laws of the country
#3
remain unless such as are against the laws of God. The ortodox doc-
trine i3 best stated as applied to Pennsylvania in 17l£ in an act
passed by the assembly of that colony, "Whereas it is a settled point
that as the common lav/ is the birthright of English subjects, so it
ought to be the rule in British dominions; but Acts of Parliament
have been adjudged not to extend to these plantations unless they are
particularly named in such acts."
T.n the colony of Maryland, Dulany in his "The Right of the Inhab-
#1- Sious sat, "English Statutes in Maryland" II, 20.
^2- Ohalmer's Opinions, I, 19M-
#3-31. Comm. sec. if, 107.
-"^.-shepherd: Proprietary Govt, in Penn. 390( qt.fr .Bioussat
)

6-itants of Maryland to the Benefit of the English Laws," contends tha
all English citizens enjoy English laws, hence Marylaiiders being
English citizens, must necessarily share their privileges. This
#1
important document which Siouosat terns the only pamphlet devoted to
the extension to the colonies of the laws of England, is clear in its
argument that Maryland is an integral part of the British Empire; tha
they are entitled to equal rights enjoyed by all British subjects; thii.t
the English statutes are part of their inheritance; and long continues
use and reception of these English laws, had, even without authority,
worked to give them permanent force.
This contention of MLany emphasises to a degree the position of
the English government with reference to the status of dependencies.
It was considered necessary to make a formal extension of the English
statutes to the colonies before they were binding. But the forms of
the common law were acceded and gradually became accepted in all the
colonies.
No common lav/ right received more consideration than trial by jur
It is found incorporated to a more or less extent into the constitu-
tions of the early American states. Colonial records go to show it
was considered an inalienable' birthright, Its limitation was one of
the grievances of the colonists against the mother country. The
Declaration of Independence declared its inviolability. The absence o
a Bill of Rights in the Federal constitution was used as an argument
against its ratification arid the grant of the first ten amendments
securing the rights, brought about its approval by the requisite
number of states. The meaning of the constitutional rights then agreor
upon , 'has undergone change but none to the extent of the "Great
#1- Sioussat, English Statutes in Maryland, Ch. Ill
iggg ppircnh. "Thp, Er.k-.iish common Lav/ in the Early Am. colonies,"
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[bulwark of our civil and political liberties." a jury and jury trial
v/ere interpreted to mean the unanimous verdictof twelve " Liberos et
legales homines." In some of the states the sane rights v/ere guarantee^
by provisions that no man should be deprived of his life, liberty or
property "but by the law of the land."
That the American people were exceedingly jealous of any curtail-
ment cf rights involving jury trial may be observed from the manner it
was guarded by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
#2
As late as 1#9S, the decision in Thompson v Utah declared that a stat|^
constitution could not change the ancient rule if trial by jury found
in the Sixth Amendment.
As a result of the Treaty of Peace with Spain in 1&9&, it was
found incumbent upon the American people to define the legal relation
which the superior power should, in the future, bear towards the
newly acquired possessions of Porto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and
Hawaii.
By the decisions rendered in the so-called "Insular Cases," the
Supreme Court laid down the following propositions :
-
(1) The United States possesses power to acquire new territory to the
same extent as any other nation.
(2) AS a logical sequence of this power and the express provision of
the Constitution that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful regulations and rules respecting the territory or
other property of the United States," the United States has full au-
thority to provide for the administration and government of such
territory.
#1- Parsons v Bedford, 3 Pet. k33^66\ 2 story's Const .177
#2- Thompson v Utah, 170 U. S. 3^3
7r3~ DeLima'v Bidwell, 122 U.S. 1 ; Downes v Bidwell, ISP U.S. pip).

3) The power to govern new territory la vested exclusively In ccngres^.
lj.) ir the exercise of this power, Congress is subject to practically
no limitations but mny take such action in each case as it deems best.
(5) That neither the constitution, except those provisions relating to
vhat may be called the fundamental rights or citizenship, such as foi
example, that of liberty of worship, nor the general statutes of the
United States are extended to new territory by the mere fact of its
icquisition, but only as they are expressly made applicable by legila-
tive act.
An examination of a number of case -. shows a remarkable divergence
of opinion on the part of the members of the supreme Bench respecting
the provision excepting fundamental rights of citizenship from the
>lenary power of congress in the territories. Its interpretation sheds
new light upon the constitutional status of dependencies and has boon
lost potent in the developement of the doctrine of incorporation now
deemed the supreme law of the land.
#2
in Downes v Bidweli it was held that the power to acquire terri-
tory allowed full prescription of the terms on which the incoming
people would be received. The fact that special stipulations had been
inserted in former treaties of cession in definition of the status of
the new people "implied denial of the right of the inhabitants to Amer
ican citizenship until Congress shall by further action, dignify its
assent thereto." The fear that unrestrained power on the part of
Congress would lead bo oppressive restriction of civil rights, was
loomed not .justified "in the action of congress in the past or by the
conduct of the British Parliament towards its outlying possessions
since the American Revolution." It is suggested, however, that funda-
#1 rfiiioughby, "Territories and Dependencies of the U.S. pp. 21.
/i Downes v Bidweli, 1#2 U.S. pp. 2^j-

-mental rights guaranteed by our constitution and mostly found in the
first ten Amendments, would be protected from arbitrary action by the
congress, but the logical inference from the absolute territorial
#1
clause would leave Congress unhampered by constitutional provisions.
To quote from the decision, "The liberality of Congress in the past
in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory is responsi-
ble for the belief that the Constitution operates by its ovm force
therein, but the Constitution itself is silent on the subject and
precludes the idea that the Constitution attached to these territories
as soon as acquired." The doctrine of incorporation was thus expounded,
The treaty making power cannot incorporate territory into the Unitec
States without the express or implied consent of Congress. It may
insert in a treaty, conditions against immediate incorporation. On the
other hand, when it has expressed in the treaty the conditions
favourable to incorporation, they will, if the treaty be not repudiat-
ed by Congress, have the force of the lav/ of the land, and therefore
by the fulfillment of such conditions cause incorporation to result.
It must follow where, no conditions are provided in the treaty or
T>T-ovisions are made against it , incorporation awaits the wisdom of
#2
Congress
.
In accordance with the provisions of the treaty with Spain,
Congress defined the status of the inhabitants of Porto Rico and the
Philippines which entitles them to the protection of the United 3tate|
as citizens of their respective countries, not of the Republic entit-
led to the rights and privileges guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, in
Porto Rico, citizens were held to be. as follows:- All inhabitants
#1- constitution of the U.S. Art. sec. 3
^--2- Van Dyne, Oitiaienahip in the U.S. pp. 217*

10.
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th.
day of April, 1&99, and. then resided, in Porto Rico, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as have elected to preserve their alleg-
iance to the c^ovm of Spain on or before the 11th. day of April, 1900,
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United states and Spain entered into on the 11th. day of April, 1399
(
7
>0 Stat, at L. 175M and they together with such citizens of the
United States as may reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body
politic under the name of "The People of Porto Rico." with govern-
mental pov/e^s as hereinafter jonfer^ed, and with power to sue and be
#1
sued as such."
It is to be observed that this act guarantees no more than the
protection of the United States to citizens of Porto Rico and .says
nothing about constitutional privileges. It is similar in its import
to the "most favored nation clause" in our national treaties with
foreign countries. In the case of Re Gonzales, it was held that a
native woman of Porto Rico seeXing admission to the United States,
was still an alien ".unless in an appropriate way she had since become
naturalised" ; that Congress had expressly provided by statute for the
status of Porto Ricans ( 7jl Stat, at L. 77 ) and that "This legisla-
tion has certainly not operated to effect the naturalisation of the
petitioner as a citizen of the United States. Being foreign born and
not naturalised, she was still an alien and subject to the provisions
of the law regulating the admission of aliens who come to the United
States."
7-1- 31 Stat, at L . 77 » oh. 191.
#2- Re Jonzales, 11?? Ped. 91a.
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Practically the sane definition of citizenship is given to the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as in the ease of Porto Ricans
except that citizens of the United States residing therein are not
mentioned. The status of an American citizen residing in any one of
the outlying dependencies is an interesting question. According to
the legislation of Congress, he v/ould posses,- a dual oitiz >n ;h!p.
While residing in Porto Rico he v/ould be possessed of the rights and
privileges accorded any native Porto Rican. In the Philippines, to
all intents and purposes of the constitution, he vould be a Filipino.
Thus we have the anomaloiis situation of an American citizen being
"outside the Constitution" while still an occupant of American terri-
tory. Says Justice Harlan, "According to the principles of the
opinion just gendered -either the Governo* nor any American officer
in the Philippines, altho citizens of the United states, althc under
an oath to support the Constitution, r and altho in those distant
posses tions for the purpose of enforcing the authority of the United
States, can claim, of right, the benefit of the jury provisions of
Constitution, if tried for crime committed in those Islands. There
are many thousand American soldiers in the Philippines. They are then jj
by commanc 1 cf the United States to enforee its authority. They carry
the flag of the United States and have not lost their American
citizenship. Yet, if charged in the Philippines with having committed
a crime against the United states, of which a civil tribunal may take
cognizance, they cannot, under the present decision, claim of right
a trial by jury .
«
one of the leading cases involving the question of the civil
#1- 32 Stat, at L. Ch. 1369, Act of July 1, 1902.
#2- Dorr ? Unites States, 5#3 U.S.
1
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rights of the inhabitants of dependent territory was a jury trial
v 1
case decided by the supreme Court in 1903 , viz. Hawaii v Itankichi.
A review of this case affords a most interesting insight into the
theories of the members of the court respecting the relation of our
Constitution to dependencies And the inhabitants thereof. Briefly, the
facts of the case are as follows:- Hawaii was annwxed to the United
States by joint resolution of congress, July 7. 149* « bv 11 was
expressly provided that, "The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian
Islands not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to
the constitution of the United states, shall remain in force until
the Congress of the United States, shall otherwise determine."
Uanfclehl committed the crltto of manslaughter some time between the
date of the annexation resolution and subsequent legislation of
Congress respecting the constitutional status of the territory. He war:
tried and convicted according to a procedure customary in Hawaii. The
Hawaiian laws provided for a trial on information without a grand
jury and for a conviction upon a vote of a petit jury of nine men.
The appellee claimed that the provisions of Article III, section 2,
and Articles V and VI of the Constitution of the United States were
applicable to his case but that he wafi denied them. A petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus brought the case to the Supreme Court which was
called upon to decide ( 1 ) Whether the annexation resolution operated
to make the constitutional provisions immediately applicable to Hawaii.
(2) If the Constitution did not operate, whether there were not
certain limitations upon the powers of congress by which certain
fundamental rights could not bo abrogated, one of which was trial by
"a constitutional jury.
0- Hav/aii v Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197-
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Counsel for the appellee in an able argument contended, that the
constitutional provisions were applicable to the Hawaiian Islands
from the moment of annexation. ( 1 ) It was annexed by act of Congress,
not by treaty. (2) The intention of congress kg manifested in its
treatment of the Islands, was to extend ail constitutional privileges
and protection. (?) The resolution had abrogated all municipal
legislation contrary to the Constitution of the United states. Much
ingenious argument was advanced to show that Hawaii was incorporated
thru extension of the Constitution by the Act of Annexation, thus
placing the rights of the accused Hankichi in line with the decision
of the court in the Downus v Bidwell case.
The justices denied the right of the petition by a vote of five to
four. Justices White, UoKenna and two othej b used the precedents
cited in Downes v Bidwell and considered a trial by jury not essentia^,
because the joint resolution had not incorporated Hawaii, hence the
constitutional provisions did not apply. Justice Bro^m concurred in
the decision on the ground that, altho incorporation did entitle to
the ben-fits of the Constitution and Hawaii w*s fully incorporated
by the ilewlands resolution, Mankichi should be denied the two rights
in question because in his ox>inion, the constitution must be formally
extended to acquired territory by Congress before having effect.
Justice Brown held furthermore that trial by jury was not a
fundamental right as it "concern^ merely a method of procedure which
sixty years of practice had ihtfWh to be suited to the conditions in
the Islands. Justice Harlan diasenting in a separate opinion upheld
the constitutional guarantees of life, liberty and property to all
peoples coming under the jurisdiction of the United States. A new
doctrine in constitutional jurisprudence , said he, had been declared

when trial by jury was not regarded as a fundamental right. As
outlined in the preceding pages of this paper, the history of the
form of procedure known as trial by jury does not accord with Justice
Brown's opinion.
May 31, 190i|-, the case of Dorr v United States came up to the
Supreme Court, involving the question whether trial by jury is not
necessary to judicial procedure in the Philippines in the absence
of a statute expressly conferring the right. It will be readily seen
that some opinion would be cited in this Qftse as to what limitations
are to be applied to congress in legislating for a dependency.
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty with Spain,
#2
Congress, by the Act of 1902, provided for the temporary civil
government of the Philippines, by extending to the Islands such civil
rights as were deemed convenient and expedient. Both indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury were, hov/ever, omitted. .An express
provision was made to the effect that section eighteen hundred and
ninety-one of the Revised statutes of ie?7*? should not apply to the
Philippine Islands. This section gives force and effect to the
Constitution ana laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable,
within all the organised territories and every territory thereafter
organised, as elsewhere within the United States. Practically all
other constitutional safeguards to life and liberty were admitted.
Section 5 of the Act provides, "that no person shall be held to
answer for a :riminal offence without due process of law." It is
upon this provision that there is claimed in this case the right to
a trial by jury.
#1- Dorr- and Obrien v U. S., 5#3 U.S.
#2- 32 statuses, 691.
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The decision of the judges was controlled to a great degree b$
the Mankichi case in which it had been said that the constitutional
clauses respecting trial by jury were not considered as limitations
on the powers of Congress when providing government for the territor-
ies. Whatever limitations are provided, trial by jury is not one of
them. "These limitations must be decided as to extent as they arise,"
says Justice Day in giving the opinion of the court. The doctrine of
Incorporation as laid down in Downea v Bidwell was reaffirmed. The
doctrine was strengthened by the fact that Congress, on the assumption
of a free habd in dealing with non-incorporated territories, had
mentioned section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of the Revised
Statutes as not applicable to the Islands.
The opinion of Justice Brown that trial by jury is not a funda-
mental right is by implication given some weight, in the decision. To
quote, "In case of a fair and orderly trial being already provided
for acquired territory or the inhabitants were unsuited to a form of
procedure, even if, ?omnon in the United States, there would not nnly
be no need of it, but if introduced, it might work prejudice." In
other words, trial by jury in the dependencies was governed by a
doctrine of political expediency or convenience and would be extended
like other civil rights by Congress at the proper time. Justice
Peckham in concurring distinctly states this view by asserting that
as in the case of Mankichi in Hawaii, so in the Philippines, trial
by jury is not a constitutional necessity.
The ooinion of Justice Harlan dissenting, reads much like that of
the argument of Dulany when contending for the English statutes in
Maryland. As Englishmen in Maryland had not been banished; had not
abjured England and had never swerved from their allegiance and hence
^i-Tha fticrht. nf the Inhabitants of Maryland to the Benefit of Eng. Law,
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were entitled to advantages of tha Bngllsh lawn, 33 American citizens
and those under American sovereignty ought not to 03 considered out-
side tha Constitution and the civil rights conferred by it. A. vigorou|
assertion that fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution
included all of them for all peoples under the American flag and that
any disregard for tftftfl amended tha Constitution by judicial construc-
tion, constitutes the body of this opinion. The "ab inconvenient
V
doctrine la hell to be of "slight conssqusnce compared with the dan-
gers to aur system of government arising from judicial amendments of
the Constitution." Cities is of th3 United States resident in tha
outlying possessions could well f33l a responsive sympathy to the
declaration that the constitution never intended our people to be
deprivad of vhat :.Ir. Justice Story daemed "the great bulwarX of their
ei/il and political libsrties" and wha* the Supreme JWTt hai formerly
h3ld to bs "justly dear to the American psople."
It vat deeraad not expedient to do away entirely with the ends
sought by the system of trial by jury, for th3 Philippine commission
in the nrv Civil Code of the Philippines, enacted June 11, 19C1
provided for a quasi-jury trial by introducing th3 system of assessor^*
found in aerman and English dependencies. According to this system,
eith3r party to an action in a court of first instance has tha right
to request that %M assessors shall sit vith the judge for the pur-
pose of determining the facts in ths case. These two assessors are
selected from a list aonsisting of not less than ten or more than
twenty-five names Arava up by the judge of tha eourt with the assist
j
ance of the governor of th3 province and th3 clerK of the court,
from among residents of tha province osst fitt?i by their education,
#1- Public Laws and Resolutions of th3 ?htl. Comm., 1901,Act 15$
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natural ability or reputation for honesty to serve in that capacity.
The t fto assessors are 33.I acted from this list oy saoh party to the
action alternately striding out one name from the list until only two
nana 5 renain, vhieh two thsn serve. The final responsibility for the
l3 3iSion, however, rests with tha judge. If the two assessors are both
of the opinion that the decision of the judga as regards the fasts, 13
wrong, tney must reduce their (Uasent to writing, wh.iah writing ffill
then ba considarad and liven its proper weight by the Supreme ^ourt
upon the matter going to it on appeal. r.a3 Joaraission sonside? this
system U3eral (1) as an aid to th3 jadge (2) as a safsguard to th3
intare3ts Involved aid (3) aa a means of sduoation of tha peopl3.#l
- ?
How3ver an 3xamination of tha 3apo?ts af the Philippine Tommission
on the administration of justice in th3 Islands fails to mention any
g.-3at use 3ing made of th3 assessor system. As stated in the report
justice had not suffered fa? lac* if trial by jury but as questions of-
fset /are usually dst3?a.lnai by a sii*l3 .judge, it was deemed wise
to allow an easy way of appeal to the Supreme Court, so that such
questions could be determined by review by seven eminent men. To quote
It is practically the unanimous Judgment of all who are familiar
with the local situation that the prevailing system is far better
adapted to conditions existing in the islands at the present time,
than would be any system that could be deviled involving introduction
of jury trials." This opinion seams justified by the facts and lends
weight to the "ab inoonvenienti" oonstruotion of the Constitution
respecting legislation for the dependencies
.
#1- '7illoughby-Ter:?itories and Dependencies of the U.S., pp. 222
#2- Reports of the Philippine commi ssion, 1906, part 3, pp.l*

1*
That it was B the intention of Congress to carry soma of the essen-
tial principles of American constitutional jurisprudence to the
Philippines and engraft them upon the lav/ of the people newly subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States," is illustrated by the
#1
Kepne^ Case decided bv the Supreme Court of the United states in
#2
19014.. Thos. E. Kepner \-/as acquitted of the charge of "estafa" in a
court of first, instance but upon appellate proceedings by the govern-
ment, was convicted in the Supreme court of the Islands. Appeal was
tafcen to the Supreme Court of trie United States on they ground of
violation of the constitutional civil right found in the Fifth Amend-
ment. Th.1 ; provision had been expressly extended to the Philippines
July 1, 1902 as found in section 5 ,he act, "That no person for
the name offence shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment." This
section is practical.ly verbatin the language of the President's
instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900. These
instructions read," In all the forms of government and administrative
provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission
should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing
is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our
theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be
made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even ftftsir
prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the soooioj)3 1 shment
of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.
At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the islands should be made plainly to understand, that
#1- Thos. E. Kepne-r> v U. S. 2\py and 5#M- U. S.
j~2- Local term-Misuse of funds, embezzlement.
#3- 32 5tat—691.
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there are certain great principles of government which have been Made
the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the
rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which
they have, unfortunate!:', been denied the experience possessed by us;
that there are also certain practical rules of government which we
have found to be essential to the preservation of these great princi-
ples of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of
govern lent must be established and maintained in their inlands for the
sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict
with the customs or laws of procedure with Which they are fami.V.ar.
It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the Philippine
Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules
and Utosy will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.
Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines,
therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules.
That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
Without due process of law; that private property shall not be taKen
for public use Without just compensation; that in all criminal pros-
ecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence; that excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the game
offano
;
or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searchos
and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involun-
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-tary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for erime; that no
bill of attainder or ex post faoto law shall be passed; that no lav/
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assembl and petition the
government for a redress of grievance- that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the frae
exorcise thereof , and that the free exercise and enjoyment of relig-
ious p^ofes.sion and worship without discrimination or preference,
#1
shall forever be allowed."
Both the President and Congress therefore, fully agreed that the
people of the Philippines should be given much of the protection of
the Constitution affecting civil rights. Except for trial by jury,
and the right of the people to bear arms, the instruct ions of the
President extend the provisions of the first nine amendments of the
Constitution. In addition, the instructions forbid slavery or invol-
untary servitude except as punishment for crime and prohibit the
passage of a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.
In the Kepner case, the government pleaded the provisions of the
Spanish laws on the subject when the offence was committed, which
viewed a person as not being in jeopardy in the legal sense until
there had been a final Judgment of the audiencia."
The court in its decision declared that Congress in the Act of
July 1, 1902, must be held to have intended to use the words respect-
ing jeopardy in the well Known sense as declared and settled by
previous decisions of the com- 4-. ; therefore, a second trial after
> acquittal was contrary to section 5 of the act in question. In brief
the Supreme Court decides this case by interpreting double jeopardy
#1- Public Laws and Resolutions of the Phil. Comm., 6-9.
vnpmr v United states . PlU i-U . S..
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in the light of its constitutional moaning as laid, down in former
decisions, not according to what double jeopardy was understood to bo
in the past. To quote from the decision, : ' How could it be success-
fully Maintained that these expressions of fundamental rights
could be used by Congress in any other sense than that which has been
placed upon them in construing that instrument from which they were
taken.
"
Justice Brown dissented on the ground that the intention of
Congress was to adopt the Spanish view of jeopardy in the extension of
the right to the Islands; that by the decision, too great power would
be placed in the hands of a single judge. Three other justices dissent-
ed by reason of inability to agree on the proper definition of double
jeopardy. Said Justice Holmes dissenting, "Logically and rationally
a man cuinot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same oauso
however often he may bo tried. There can be but one jeopardy in one
o ase .
"
The importance of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 cannot esoapci
attention. This act is the authority for the civil rights allowed the
Philippine islands. By it, Congress makes clear its intentions and
exercises the power to deal with the territories a- it sees fit.
Excepting the right of trial by jury and the right of the people to
bn.-u arms, there is extended the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Jnited States. It repeals all acts and orders not in accordance
With it. It becomes the Constitution of the Philippine Islands at the
discretion of Congress, to grant, withhold or amend. .Rut its provision li
//ill be interpreted by the Supreme Court according to the principles
governing the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.
-rl- .'lilitary Order 58 as amended by act 19^ of the PMl.Comn.
t.hhoiflin"; lojuhlg jaojgaxdag aLauag gran gjaagat^oa tha Maadfa '
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Just how much influence political expediency exercised on the
decision of the court is open to question. It would seen that, had tlx
Spanish view of double Jeopardy been uptoeld, appeals of a like oharae
ter would have blocked the courts. According to the report of the Keac
#1
ftf Finance and Justice the decision in the Kepner case had the effec
of dismissing from the docKet a number of cases in which such appeals
had been taken. It is to be observed that the question of the right to
a trial by jury is not presented in this case. It would be interesting
to know, however, If it could be clas .ed among those " expressions of
fundamental rights which have been the subj^L f frequent adjudication
in the courts of this country."
In the case of " in Re Ross" it was decided that trial by jury
was nee ne^ess ary to judicial procedure in a consular oourt in Japan.
It was held that the constitutional guarantees applied only to citizens
and others within the United States or who are brought there for trial
for alleged offences committed elsewhere, not to residents and tempor-
ary sojourners abroad. To quote Justice Brown in the case, "The
Constitution does not apply to foreign countries or to trials therein
conducted and Congress may lav/fully provide for such trials before
qansular tribunals without the intervention of a grand or petit jury.
Th _; .; case is held by counsel in the Manicichi ease not to apply to
our dependencies as the consular courts were tribunals set up in placd
of Japanese courts and acted Wholly by permission of the Japanese
government. Our territorial courts on the other hand, derive their
authority wholly from the United States, thru the expressed will of
Congress
.
rl- Reports, Phil. Comm. 1905, Part H.
7/-2- In Re Ross, 14-0 U.S. 4.53
#3- Hawaii v Mankichi, 19 U. S. 197
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Of cases involving the question of civil rights in dependent
Mi
territory, it remains to examine that of Rasmus sen v United States.
This ease was decided by the Supreme Court in 1905. One Rasnussen, a
native of Alaska, took exception to the mode of trial provided by
#2
section 171 of the Code for Alaska adopted by Congress, vis., a jury
composed of six men and demanded a common law Jury. This having been
denied, upon conviction an appeal was taken to thj Supreme Court of
the United States. Reliance for a reversal of the I xj is ion of the
Alaskan court v/as placed upon a violation of the Sixth Amendment . It
is readily seen from tho cases heretofore discussed that the applica-
tion of the right demanded rests upon whether Alaska /as or was not
incorporated into the territory of the United States. The government
as appellant denied such incorporation. A second contention was that,
even if incorporated, the provisions of the Sixth Amendment did not
apply to Alaska, being an unorganised territory.
The reasoning of the court leading to the decisions in Hawaii v
':.mkio:ii and Dor 1" v United States was here applied. The result was that
Alaska was defined as a fully incorporated territory of the United
States and as territory entitled to til 3 civil rights guaranteed to
such by the Constitution.
The treaty by which Alaska was acquired and the subsequent treat-
ment of tli territory by Congress, are factors of importance. Article
t5
III of the treaty with Russia rend3, "That the inhabitants of the
ceded territory shall be admitted to the full enjoyment of all the
rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States."
This .treaty was the supreme lav/ of the land. Subsequent legislation
#1- Frederick Rasmussen v U. S. 51 U.S.
#2- 31 Stat. 353
#3- Art. Ill, Treaty with Russia, I&67.
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had. brought about the incorporation of the territory.
fa thus ara introduced to the true criterion for judging tha
status of a dependency. If incorporated, it becomes an integral part
of the territory of the United states. vrhat constitutes incorporation
nay be gained from the acts of Congress respecting the dependency
whether its treatment is such as to lead to its having an incorporate*
status. The treaty of cession or means of acquisition is all important
In Hawaii v UanKiohi, annexation had not incorporated the territory
as subsequent action of Congress in maintaining the existing custom
duties and the laws respecting Chinese immigration into the United
Statee. precluded such an intention by congress, in Dor- v United
States, the treaty of cession reserved the civil status of the acquir-
ed territory for ulterior action by Congress. Legislation subsequently
shows the manifest intention of Congress not to Incorporate the
Philippines, for in the act providing a temporary civil government
in the Islands, it was expressly 3tated that section eighteen hundred
and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of I8~f8 did not apply.
In the case under consideration, the treaty extended all the righl
advantages and immunities of oitizena of the United States to the
incoming inhabitants. This may be termed the incorporation formula.
It is pointed out in the decision that this formula is equivalent
to a declaration of purpose to incorporate acquired territory into
the United States, especially in the absence of other provisions
showing an intention to the contrary. All treaties before 1#9#
involving the acquisition of territory, had embraced this formula in
one form or another providing that the people should be incorporated
into th ) Union and admitted to the rights of citizens. In the LianKich:
#1- Art. IX, Treaty with Spain, 1£9&-
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case, it was claimed by counsel and. denied the court that Hawaii
had been favored with the formula by the words of the Newlands
resolution which declares that the Islands " be and they are hereby
annexed as part of the territory of the United States."
subseouen, events prove that Congress carried out its declaration
#1
of purpose to incorporate Alaska (1) by the Act of July 2Q,1£6&
concerning internal revenue taxation and (2) by the Act of July 27,
#2
1#6# by which the laws of the United States relating to oust oris,
commerce and navigation were extended over Alaska and a collection
district established therein, such treatment, it will be recalled, had
been withheld from the territories of Hawaii and the Philippines. The
7/-J>
court further points out that by its own decisions, Alaska had been
accorded the status of one of the territories. An order of the court
of May 11, 1#91 had assigned the territory of Alaska to the Ninth
Judicial Circuit. In the opinion of the justices in Binn v United
States, " Alaska had been undoubtedly incorporated into the United
States." In none of the cases discussed previously was the territory
assigned to the jurisdiction of a court of the United States by in-
cluding it in one of the regular judicial circuits. It is therefore
made manifest that territorial courts per se are not considered courts
of the United States within the meaning >f that article of the
Constitution treating of th3 judicial power, but any inclusion of them
in e judicial circuit of the United States would be strong presumptuous
evidence that such territory had been incorporated.
" That even if Alaska was incorporated into the United States, as
it was not an organised territory, therefore the provisions of the
•fi- 15 rtat. 167, oft. 1&6, sec. 107.
yr-2- 15 " . 21+0 » 237
#3-* Steamer Ooquitlan v United states, 163 U.S. 311-6.
Binn v U.S. 19)1. U.S. >j£6.
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Amenonent vrera not aontrolling upon Congress in legislating
for Alaska." In its decision upon this point made by the government,
the court allows for a distinction between incorporated and organised
territories and defines in a general way the status Qf each. The
7/"l
government rested its contention on former decisions of the court
that the civil rights guaranteed in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh
Amendments applied only to territories to Wfcloh section eight eon
hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of 1<>7£, had been ox-
tended, vin. organised territories, of Which AlasKa wa3 not one. Per
#1
example, in the case of American Publishing Company v Fisher, the
decision that the territorial lav/ of Utah authorizing a verdict when
nine Jurors conferred, was invalid rested solely on the ground that
Congress had by Act of Sept. 9, 1&50, extended the Constitution and
laws of the United States over the territory. Mo such extension had
been made in the case of Alaska
.
But says the court in the Rasmussen decision, "The act or acts of
Congress purporting to extend the constitution ( in cases cited ) are
considered as declaratory merely of a result which existed independen
ly by the inherent operation of the Constitution." The conclusion of
the court rests upon the self-operative application of the Constitu-
tion. Territory which har- been accorded the treatment of an integral
part of the United States is distinguished from territory net so
treated. Both may be considered part of the United states but in a
different sense. In the former clas^, the inhabitants are entitled
to the guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments. Exten-
sion of the Constitution is not necessary in such a class for it has
#1- Am. Pub. Company v Fisher, 166 U.S. 4.614.
- Thompson v Utah, 170 U.S. 3*1-3
- Springville v Thomas, 166 U.S. 707
- Capitol Traction Company v Hof, 17M- U.S. 1
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already been extended "ex^roorio vigors" thru incorporation proceed-
In Thompson v Utah the court held trial by Jury to be an inherent
right of the territories, "That the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States relating to the right of trial by jury in suits at
common lav; apply to the territories of the United States is no longer
an op 311 question." Viewed in the light of the Rasmussen case, this
must be qualified by the words, "if organised or incorporated." Utah
was not allowed to substitute a jury of eight for the common law jury
being an organised territory and Alaska was permitted the jury
provisions of the constitution, being incorporated. But, as laid down
in the Rasmussen case by Justice White, the test of the application
of the constitutional guarantees is not
organisation of the territory
but its incorporation. Accordingly, there is no reason why the
division of territory into organised and unorganised, be longer re-
tained. Territory is recognised by the Supreme Court as belonging to
either of the two classes, incorporated and non-incorporated. The
provisions of the Constitution extend to incorporated territory " ex
proprio vigore." In non-incorporated territory, civil rights await
the decision of congress as to the wisdom or need of extension.
Justice Erown concurring, dissents vigorously from the reasoning
applied in the reaching of the decision. At some length he defines
his position on the incorporation doctrine. As Justice Harlan found
a new doctrine in our constitutional jurisprudence" the opinion of
Justice Brown that the benefits of the jury clauses in the Constitu-
tion were not fundamental in their nature, so Justice Brown declares
#1- Thompson v Utah, 170, U.S. 3^3
.
&2r Dorr v U.S. 533, U.S.
#3- Rasmussen v U.S., 31 u. S.
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a "new departure in federal jurisprudence" the theory of the extension
of the constitution thru the incorporation of territory. He places
great stress on the intent of Congress as the test of the applicabil-
ity of the constitution, not incorporation. This intent would be best
shown by a formal extension of the "provisions of the Constitution to
the territory which when once done would be irrevocable . He finds a
new" element of confusion" in the classification of territory as
incorporated when another method, heretofore provided, seened to meet
the requirements cf the esse.
In the decisions and opinions delivered by the several justices
in the preceding cases discussed, it remains to be seen how r.uch may
be termed legally acceptable. Precluding any future reversal cf
opinion by the court, the following may Bald to be binding law:-
( 1 ) The doctrine ( altho new to our jurisprudence ) that dependent
territory receives ex propric vigore full constitutional rights and
privileges of citizens of the United States, when incorporated.
(2) What constitutes incorporation is determined by the attitude of
Congress towards the dependency in view of the set of cession.
(3) Trial by jury i3 not necessary to Federal judicial procedure in
the territories in the absence of a special ststute conferring the
right.
Fundamental rights, if extended to the dependencies, are to be
interpreted in the historical sense and with respect to their meaning
to the American people in the past, not according to any significance
attached to them in the dependencies to which the right had been
extended.
It can hprdly be maintained that Justice Brown's contention that
trial by jury is not * fundamental right but a mere method of pro-
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-cedure, is law altho concurred in by a majority of the justices as
a basis for the decision in Dorr case. The action of the justices is
explained by the desire to have the decision in the Dorr case rest
upon the decision in the Mankichi case.
Among the dependencies of the United states there are here and
there a number of islands classed as •appurtenant territory," the
so-called Guano Islands. V/e have no opinion respecting the constitu-
tional status of such dependencies. In the case of Duncan vNavasse
#1
Phosphate Company a decision was had upon a claim to dower in the
right to exploit a certain guano island. The court said," Congress
has not legislated concerning any civil rights upon guano islands;
but has left such rights to be governed by whatever laws may apply to
to citizens of the United States in countries which have no civilised
government of their own." This clause is susceptible of further
interpretation.
Y/e see, therefore, that while the civil rights ibf the people of
the United States are found in a written instrument in which may be
read the principles that govern the nation, the law of the dependenc-
ies is largely unwritten and the civil status of such territory and
the rights of the people there, are hidden In what the Supreme Court
of the united States interprets to be due their political ahd social
development
.
#1- Duncan v Nav Phos. Company, 137 U.S. 61+7.
+++
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